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Abstract
We propose a concrete family of dense lattices of arbitrary dimension n in which the lattice
bounded distance decoding (BDD) problem can be solved in deterministic polynomial time.
This construction is directly adapted from the Chor–Rivest cryptosystem (IEEE-TIT 1988).
The lattice construction needs discrete logarithm computations that can be made in determin-
istic polynomial time for well-chosen parameters. Each lattice comes with a deterministic
polynomial time decoding algorithm able to decode up to large radius. Namely, we reach
decoding radius within O(log n) Minkowski’s bound, for both 1 and 2 norms.
Keywords Dense lattices · Bounded distance decoding (BDD) · Minkoswki’s bound
Mathematics Subject Classification 94B35 · 94B65 · 11H31 · 11H71
1 Introduction
Sphere packing Given a large number of equal non-overlapping spheres, the question of
finding the most efficient way to pack them together is quite an old problem. Arranging
the spheres so that their centers form an Euclidean lattice (a.k.a quadratic form) helps to
find solutions. For instance, in two dimensions and with the Euclidean norm, Kepler already
conjectured in 1610 that the familiar hexagonal lattice solves the packing problem but the
first proof was only given in 1940 by Tóth [21]. However all ball arrangements are not of a
lattice nature, and, with arbitrary norm and dimension, the question whether or not the best
density is achieved on the lattice arrangements is still open. Yet, a classical method to find
(maybe not the best but) a solution to this sphere packing problem is to aim at constructing
dense lattices.
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Intuitively, the density of a lattice is the proportion of the space that is occupied by
maximum radius non-overlapping spheres centered in the lattice points. For instance the
density of the hexagonal lattice in the plane is π/
√
12 ≈ 0.907. Forgetting about spheres, the
density λ¯(p)1 (L) of a lattice L of rank n (in the p-norm) can be measured by the normalized
length of its shortest vector:
λ¯
(p)
1 (L) :=
λ
(p)
1 (L)
Vol(L)1/n , where λ
(p)
1 (L) := min
x∈L\{0} ||x ||p. (1)
Minkowski’s theorem provides an upper bound on the density of any lattice, generically:
λ¯
(p)
1 (L) ≤ M(p)n (2)
where M(p)n = 2 · Vol(B(p)n )−1/n and Vol(B(p)n ) denotes the volume of the unit ball in p-
norm in Rn . Note that this Minkowski’s bound M(p)n depends on dimension and norm only.
In particular, for the 1-norm (resp. 2-norm), the density of any n-dimensional lattice is
upperbounded by M(1)n (resp. M(2)n ) where:
M(1)n = (n!)1/n ∼ n/e (3)
M(2)n = 2 · 
(n
2
+ 1
)1/n /√
π ∼√2n/πe. (4)
For the 2 norm, we know this bound to be tight up to constant factors. Indeed, there exists
sequences of lattices for which λ¯(2)1 (L) = (
√
n), to be compared with Minkowski’s bound
which has equivalent
√
2n/πe in this case. It is for example known that random lattices
have with high probability a first normalized minima very close to this bound [1]. Explicit
constructions are also known, from Martinet [12] and from Shioda [7,20], the latter being
known as Mordell–Weil lattices.
A simpler family A(k)n of lattices was given by Craig (called repeated difference lattices
in [6, Chap. 8, Sect. 6]), and for k = (n/ log n), the minimal distance of these lattices are
logarithmically close to Minkowski’s bound in both 1 and 2 norms:
λ¯
(1)
1 (A
(k)
n ) ≥ (n/ log n) (5)
λ¯
(2)
1 (A
(k)
n ) ≥ (
√
n/ log n). (6)
Bounded distance decoding The bounded distance decoding (BDD) problem is the algo-
rithmic facet of sphere packing.
Definition 1 (Bounded distance decoding problem in p-norm) For a full-rank lattice L ⊂
R
n
, and a bounded decoding radius r (p) ≤ λ(p)1 (L)/2, given a target:
t = v + e,
where v ∈ L and ||e||p < r (p), recover v and e.
As for the density we will note r¯ (p) the normalized decoding radius r¯ (p) = r (p)/Vol(L)1/n .
Note that the condition r (p) ≤ λ(p)1 (L)/2 guarantees the unicity of the solution, but we cannot
insure it beyond this radius. Indeed, let x be a short vector such that ||x ||p = λ(p)1 then, for
an error e = x/2, namely for an instance t = 3x/2, we cannot tell if t comes from the lattice
vectors x or 2x .
The bounded distance decoding problem plays a crucial role in communication over a
noisy channel, as it allows to separate a codeword v ∈ L from the noise e introduced by the
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channel. For the square lattice Zn , this problem is trivial since we just need to round each
coordinate to the nearest integer. Yet, this is far from one could hope for in term of error
tolerance, since the best radius r¯ (2) = r (2) = λ(2)1 (Zn)/2 = 1/2 is constant. One instead
hopes to get a decoding radius as close as possible to half of Minkowski’s bound, namely
of the order of magnitude of
√
n. Unfortunately, efficient decoding algorithm are not known
for very dense lattices as random ones, Martinet’s, Mordell–Weil’s or Craig’s lattices.
Currently, the best normalized decoding radius achievable in polynomial time was given
by Micciancio and Nicolosi [13] over Barnes–Wall lattices BWN (of dimension n = 2N ).
It reaches the maximal decoding radius in 2-norm and can even be efficiently extended
to list-decoding [8], but remains quite far from Minkowski’s bound. Indeed, the maximal
decoding radius r (2) = λ(2)1 (BWN )/2 is only such that:
r¯ (2) = ( 4√n).
While strict BDD close to Minkowski’s bound was still an open problem, a relaxed variant
allowing a small probability of failure over the randomness of the error term e was recently
solved by Yan et al. [22] using construction D over Polar-codes.
Related work Quickly leaving lattices for error correcting codes (ECC), we mention a recent
work of Brier et al. [3] that is very similar in spirit: they extract an efficiently decodable binary
error correcting code for the Hamming weight out of Naccache and Stern’s cryptosystems [4,
14]. Our paper explores a different notion of density coming from different metrics, namely
we focus on both 1 and 2 norms instead of Hamming distance, and we do not construct
a binary code but a decodable family of lattices, which can be seen as continuous error
correcting codes.
While our work was rather based on the public key encryption schemes of [5,10,15],
these schemes, together with Naccache and Stern’s ones [4,14], form a common family of
cryptosystems.
Relation to efficient decoding for the AWGN channel For applications to communication
over noisy channels, the noise e is typically modeled as having independent gaussian coor-
dinates ei ∼ N (0, σ )2, and Minkowski’s bounds translate to a maximal noise parameter
σ 2max = Vol(L)
2/n
2πe [18]. In this setting, our decoding algorithms is able to decode up to a
parameter σ = σmax/O(log n), except with probability exponentially small in the dimension
n over the randomness of the error e.
We nevertheless note that our result is not sufficient for such applications: indeed, while
we do have an efficient decoding algorithm, we do not have an efficient encoding algorithm.
Namely, one would ideally be able to sample short vectors L following a discrete gaussian
distribution, such as done in [22]. Unfortunately, for the lattices constructed in this paper, it
is not even clear how to efficiently construct a single short vector.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we show how to construct dense lattices admitting efficient BDD algorithm
for a radius near Minkowski’s bound for both 1 and 2 norms. Namely, for the 2-norm we
reach:
r¯ (2) = 
(√
n
ln n
)
,
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to be compared with the best known radius over Barnes–Wall lattices that is ( 4
√
n) and with
the theoretical Minkowski’s bound that is equivalent to (
√
n). For the 1-norm we reach:
r¯ (1) = 
( n
ln n
)
,
to be compared with the theoretical Minkowski’s bound that is equivalent to (n). Con-
structing a lattice and running the associated decoding algorithm have both polynomial time
complexity. Moreover, we emphasize that neither the construction nor the decoding algorithm
make use of a quantum computer: their construction rely on discrete logarithm computations,
which can be made easy by appropriate parametrization.
The construction is not so new, since it is directly inspired from deprecated knapsack-
based cryptosystems first proposed in 1988 by Chor and Rivest [5,10]. Their construction is
based on discrete logarithm over finite-field extension, yet a very similar construction was
proposed by Okamoto et al. [15] relying merely on discrete logarithm of modular integers.
For ease of presentation, we base ourselves on the later.
The core idea behind those cryptosystems is that the subset-prime-product problem over
the integers is an easy problem. More precisely, if p1, . . . , pm ≤ B are primes, given t =∏
peii mod m for positive integers ei , and assuming B||e||1 ≤ m, recovering e can easily
be done by trial divisions. Taking discrete logarithms allows to convert this to a subset-sum
problem, that was the underlying hard problem of these protocols.
Ignoring the cryptographic countermeasures making this subset-sum instance hard to
an adversary, we re-interpret this construction as a lattice error-correction scheme. This
construction is done in Sect. 3.1. Discrete logarithm computations occur while constructing
such a lattice, but they can be made easy by appropriate choice of m, and do not need any
quantum computer algorithm.
In order to decode such a lattice, the only remaining technicality to be dealt with is the
fact that, in these previous protocols, the decoded error e is assumed to have positive integer
coefficients. The integrality condition is easily solved by rounding. The positivity condition
can also be removed by rational reconstruction, i.e. solving the shortest-vector problem in
dimension 2. Our decoding algorithm is detailed in Sect. 3.2. In Sect. 3.3 we propose concrete
well-chosen parameters to build a family of dense lattices with polynomial time decoding
algorithms. Finally in Sect. 4 we discuss about some generalizations of the scheme that could
help in practice to obtain better decoding radius—but all these slight changes do not interfere
with our asymptotic results.
2 Preliminaries
Notation In the sequel, if x ∈ Rn is a vector, then xi denotes its i th coordinate. The p-norm
of a vector x is noted ||x ||p , and is defined by ||x ||p =
(∑ |xi |p
)1/p
. Moreover we denote
by 	x
 the coefficient-wise rounding to Zn .
Useful inequalities We make use of the following statements:
∀x ∈ Rn, ||x ||1 ≤
√
n · ||x ||2. (7)
∀x ∈ Rn, ||	x
||1 ≤ 2||x ||1. (8)
Inequality (7) is an application of Cauchy–Schwarz’s inequality in the Euclidean space Rn .
Besides, Inequality (8) comes from inequality |	y
| ≤ 2|y| for any real number y.
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Factoring
Definition 1 Let B be a natural integer. An integer is B-smooth if all its factors are lower or
equal to B.
Factoring is considered as a hard problem in cryptography. Yet, when we know we have
a smooth number, it becomes much more easy to factorize it.
Proposition 1 (Factorisation by trial division) If B is a natural integer and n a B-smooth
integer with k factors, then one can find the whole factorization of n with complexity:
O(B · k · (log n)2).
Proof Let n be the target number we want to factorize. With these hypotheses, the simplest
algorithm consists in trying all prime p lower than B and to see if it factors n or not. If it
does, we pursue with the quotient n/p. The algorithm ends when we have found all its k
factors (with multiplicity). Each trial division costs O((log n)2) bit operations. Note that this
exponent 2 depends on the underlying multiplication algorithm, so it can be improved with
fast algorithms. unionsq
Remark 1 If B gets large, algorithms such as Pollard-ρ [17], or even Lenstra’s elliptic curve
method [9] will eventually become much faster for factorization. Yet for our application B
will be no larger than (n log n) where n is the dimension of the considered lattice: it is
plausible that trial division remains the fastest method for parameters of interest.
Discrete logarithm As for factoring, computing discrete logarithms in a group that has a
smooth order is easier than in a generic group of the same order of magnitude. It comes from
the fact that Pohlig–Hellman algorithm [16] helps to reduce the problem to computing discrete
logarithms in all the subgroups, so that the main parameter to discuss with the hardness of
computing discrete logarithms is not the size of the group itself, but the size of its largest
subgroup of prime order. This remark will help to construct a family of lattices without being
bothered by these computations. More precisely:
Proposition 2 For any group G of order ∏ paii , where the pi ’s’ are distinct prime num-
bers, using a combination of Pohlig–Hellman [16] and Pollard-ρ [17] algorithms permits to
compute discrete logarithms in G in:
O
(∑
ai (ln(|G|) + √pi )
)
group operations.
3 Discrete logarithm based family of lattices
3.1 Settings and construction
Let us fix n a natural integer and m an integer such that (Z/mZ)∗ is a cyclic group.1 Recall
that the size of the group (Z/mZ)∗ is ϕ(m), where ϕ denotes Euler’s totient function. Now
let B be a natural integer depending on n such that the set of prime numbers F ⊂ N defined
as:
F = {p ∈ N | p prime, p does not divide m and p  B},
1 Later we relax this assumption and discuss about m.
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has exactly n elements p1, . . . , pn . Recall that the kth prime number is asymptotically equiva-
lent to k log k. Thus we have B ∼ n log n asymptotically. Now, consider the group morphism:
ψ : Zn → (Z/mZ)∗
(x1, . . . , xn) →
n∏
i=1
pxii mod m.
The lattice of multiplicative relation between p1, . . . , pn is defined as:
L := ker ψ =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Zn |
n∏
i=1
pxii = 1 mod m
}
.
As L is a full rank sublattice of Zn , we have Vol(L) = |Zn/L| = | Im ψ |. In consequence
Vol(L) ≤ ϕ(m), with equality if and only if ψ is surjective.
Calling g a generator of the multiplicative cyclic group (Z/mZ)∗, we see that L is a lattice
of dimension n that can be rewritten as:
L =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Zn |
n∑
i=1
xi logg pi = 0 mod ϕ(m)
}
. (9)
Note that the above equation holds independently of the choice of the generator g. If one of
the prime p ∈ F is a generator of (Z/mZ)∗ we are even able to explicit a basis of this lattice.
Indeed, let’s assume that g = pn is a generator of (Z/mZ)∗. An explicit basis of L can be
constructed as the row vectors of the following matrix:
M =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 − logg p1
1 − logg p2
. . .
...
1 − logg pn−1
ϕ(m)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where blank entries should be read as 0.
Indeed, by definition of the discrete logarithm, we have pi · g− logg pi = pi · p−1i =
1 mod m, so each row M belong to L (for the last row, one needs to resort to Fermat’s
theorem). Note that pn = g is a generator of (Z/mZ)∗, therefore the morphismψ is surjective,
which imply Vol(L) = φ(m). Since det(M) = φ(M) = Vol(L), we conclude that M is
indeed a basis of L.
Explicit bases can also be efficiently constructed without the assumption that pn generates
(Z/mZ)∗ but requires more care. We emphasize that the volume of L is then not necessarily
equal to ϕ(m), but cannot be larger.
Remark 2 Thus to explicitly construct the basis we need to compute all the discrete logarithms
in F modulo ϕ(m). We will discuss about complexity and efficiency in Sect. 3.3, while
choosing some relevant parameters.
3.2 Decoding algorithm
Beware that in this Sect. 3.2 all the radiuses are taken without any consideration of the
volume—namely, they are not normalized yet.
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3.2.1 Positive discrete errors in 1-norm
In this paragraph we present how to recover x from a given vector t = x + e where:
• x ∈ L
• e is a positive discrete bounded error, namely e ∈ Nn such that ||e||1  r (1)N , for some
yet to determine bound r (1)
N
.
The first step of the decoding algorithm consist in computing the following product modulo
m:
n∏
i=1
ptii =
n∏
i=1
pxii
n∏
i=1
peii =
n∏
i=1
peii mod m.
From ||e||1  r (1)N and p  B for any p ∈ F we get
∏n
i=1 p
ei
i  Br
(1)
N
. Efficient decoding
can be ensured up to the following 1 radius:
r
(1)
N
= ln m
ln B
. (10)
Indeed, in that case, Br
(1)
N = m so the product ∏ni=1 peii , which is lower than m, can be
computed in Z, and not only modulo m. Then we factorize this integer, which is easy since
it’s a smooth number. From this factorization we recover the error vector e.
3.2.2 Discrete errors in 1-norm
If e is again a discrete bounded error such that ||e||1  r (1)Z , but without any constraint on the
sign of its coefficients, namely e ∈ Zn , we need to slightly change the decoding algorithm.
Here we compute again f = ∏ni=1 ptii mod m, yet this is no longer equal to a product but
to a fraction of the form:
f =
n∏
i s.t. ei >0
peii ·
∏
i s.t. ei <0
peii = u/v mod m.
To recover u = ∏ni s.t. ei >0 peii and v =
∏
i s.t. ei <0 p
−ei
i not only modulo m but in Z, we use
the following rational reconstruction Lemma, already stated in [3].
Lemma 1 If u, v are positive coprime integers and invertible modulo m such that u, v <√
m/2, and if f = u/v mod m, then ±(u, v) are the shortest vectors of the 2-dimensional
lattice L = {(x, y) ∈ Z2|x − f y = 0 mod m} for the 2-norm.
In particular, given f and m, one can recover (u, v) in polynomial time.
Proof Let us assume that there exists a non-zero vector (u′, v′) ∈ L shorter than (u, v). First
note that (u′, v′) ∈ L ⊂ Z2 must be R-linearly independent of (u, v), since u and v are
coprime. Indeed, since (u, v) are coprime, we have (u, v)R ∩ Z2 = (u, v)Z.
Now consider the lattice L ′ generated by (u, v) and (u′, v′). Because L ′ is a full-rank
sublattice of L we have Vol(L ′) ≥ Vol(L). Since ( f , 1) and (m, 0) form a basis of L we
have Vol(L) = m. It leads to:
Vol(L ′) ≥ m.
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On the other hand, by Hadamard inequality we have:
Vol(L ′) ≤ ||(u, v)||2 · ||(u′, v′)||2 ≤ ||(u, v)||22 < m.
By contradiction this concludes that ±(u, v) are the shortest vectors of L . The vector (u, v)
is then easy to recover in polynomial time since L has a fixed dimension 2, for example using
Gauss’ algorithm (also known as Lagrange’s algorithm). unionsq
Having recovered the vector (u, v), it remains to recover e by factorization of u and v. In
conclusion, we have a decoding algorithm for any integer errors up to 1 radius:
r
(1)
Z
= ln(m/2)
2 · ln B . (11)
Indeed, an error bounded by this radius ensures u and v to be strictly lower than
√
m/2.
3.2.3 Continuous error in 1-norm
The generalization to continuous error is rather straightforward, and consists simply in first
rounding the target t coordinate-wise, to reduce the problem to the discrete case.
Indeed, let t = x + e where x ∈ L and e is a small error. Set t ′ = 	t
, and note that since
x ∈ L ⊂ Zn , we have t ′ = x + 	e
. Applying the previous decoding algorithm to t ′ will
yield the correct answer x if ||	e
||1 ≤ r (1)Z .
Recalling Inequality (8): ||	x
||1 ≤ 2||x ||1, we conclude that this algorithm provides a 1
decoding radius r (1) = r (1)
Z
/2, namely:
r (1) = ln(m/2)
4 · ln B . (12)
3.2.4 Continuous error in 2-norm
Inequality (7) ensures that the above algorithm also decodes errors up to 2 radius r (2) =
r (1)/
√
n, namely:
r (2) = ln(m/2)
4
√
n · ln B . (13)
Remark 3 (Generalization to p-norm) Even if the Euclidean norm (or 2-norm) is of major
interest in practice while dealing with BDD, note that the key of our algorithm is to decode in
1-norm. Actually we could generalize this decoding to any norm, by relying on inequality
||x ||1 ≤ n(p−1)/p||x ||p that is true for any x ∈ Rn . As in Sect. 3.2.4 above, it yields a
decoding algorithm for errors up to p radius:
r (p) = ln(m/2)
4n(p−1)/p · ln B .
Remark 4 As for lattice construction, the asymptotic complexity of this algorithm is detailed
later for some well-chosen parameters.
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3.3 A family of lattices approachingMinkowski’s bound
Proposition 3 For every natural integer n, we are able to construct in polynomial time an
n-dimensional lattice with a polynomial time algorithm decoding errors up to normalized
decoding radius:
r¯ (2) = 
(√
n
ln n
)
, for the Euclidean norm,
and r¯ (1) = 
( n
ln n
)
, for the 1 − norm.
In both 1 and 2 norms we reach Minkowski’s bound up to logarithmic factors. Indeed the
normalized radius of Proposition 3 needs to be compared with Minkowski’s bounds M(2)n
and M(1)n that are equivalent to:
(
√
n), for the Euclidean norm,
and (n), for the 1-norm,
where c is a constant given by Equation (3). Moreover, we only use classical algorithms so
there is no need to have a quantum computer to construct the lattice or decode it.
Proof Efficient construction. Let q be a prime number such that q  3, and n > 0 a natural
integer. Take:
m = qn .
Theorem 1 The group (Z/mZ)∗ is cyclic if and only if m is 1, 2, 4, qk or 2qn, where q is an
odd prime and n > 0 a natural integer. For all other values of m the group is not cyclic.
Theorem 1 (see for instance [19, p. 92] for more details) indicates that G = (Z/mZ)∗ is
a cyclic group of order ϕ(m) = (q − 1)qn−1. Now consider the lattice L defined by (9). We
define B as the (n + 2)th prime number, so that F precisely has order n. In the sequel we
use an equivalent for B which is easier to manipulate than the formal definition. We have
B ∼ (n + 2) log(n + 2) so:
B ∼ n log n. (14)
To explicitly construct L we need to find n discrete logarithms modulo ϕ(m). Namely if g
is a generator of G and if F = {p1, . . . , pn}, then we compute all logg pi for i = 1, . . . , n.
To compute one of these discrete logarithms we use a combination of Pohlig–Hellman [16]
and Pollard-Rho [17] algorithms. Proposition 2 underlines that for any group G ′ of order∏
taii this can be done in O
(∑
ti /|G ′| ai
(
ln(|G ′|) + √ti
))
group operations. Plugging with
our value |G| = ϕ(m) = (q −1)qn−1 we obtain one of these discrete logarithms in quadratic
time with respect to n. Thus, we are able to construct the lattice L in cubic time. Again, it’s
the extremely high smoothness of m that makes this computation feasible.
Decoding a large ball From Sect. 3.2 we can decode up to 1-radius (resp. 2-radius) r (1)
[resp. r (2)] given as in Eq. (12) (resp. Eq. (13)). To conclude we just need to compute the two
corresponding normalized radius r¯ (i) = r (i)/Vol(L)1/n for i = 1, 2. From Vol(L) ≥ ϕ(m)
we are able to decode up to:
r¯ (2) = ln(m/2)
4((q − 1)qn−1)1/n√n · ln B and r¯
(1) = ln(m/2)
4((q − 1)qn−1)1/n · ln B .
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From log m ∼ n and B ∼ n ln n we have:
r¯ (2) = 
(√
n
ln n
)
and r¯ (1) = 
( n
ln n
)
.
To deal with complexity, we recall that our decoding algorithm is simply:
1. Rounding a n-dimensional vector (namely t)
2. Computing a product modulo m (namely f )
3. Finding the shortest vector of a 2-dimensional integer lattice (namely (u, v))
4. and Factoring two B-smooth integers (namely u and v).
The first step is linear in n. The second one is linear as well. Thanks to Lemma 1 the third one
is polynomial. Concerning the last step, in order to factor u for instance, plugging k = ||e||1
in Proposition 1 make the complexity become O(B ·||e||1 ·(log u)2). From (14), ||e||1 < r (1),
r (1) = O(n), u < m and log m = O(n) we get at worst a complexity in O(n4 ln(n)) for
factoring the two B-smooth integers. Thus, our whole decoding algorithm for both 1 and 2
norms runs in polynomial time. unionsq
4 Generalizations
For a fixed n, in the previous discussion the size of the normalized radius up to which we are
able to decode varies with the ratio:
ln m
ϕ(m)
.
Here comes some variants that could help in practice to increase a bit this quantity. First one
can notice that, according to Theorem 1, choosing m = 2qn instead of m = qn maintain the
cyclicity and the size of the group (Z/mZ)∗, slightly improving the ratio ln m/ϕ(m).
4.1 Construction in a non-cyclic multiplicative group
In Sect. 3.1 we make the assumption that m is chosen such that (Z/mZ)∗ is a cyclic group.
Indeed, we can deal with more general constructions where m has no special form, except
that it is not divisible by 8. Let’s write its factorisation:
m =
k∏
i=1
peii
where pi are prime numbers and ei natural integers. If (Z/mZ)∗ is not cyclic then there is
no generator, and talking about discrete logarithm may seem meaningless. Yet thanks to the
Chinese reminder theorem:
(Z/mZ)∗ 
k∏
i=1
(Z/peii Z)
∗.
For all pi > 2 we know from Theorem 1 that (Z/peii Z)
∗ is cyclic. If pi = 2 then as soon as
ei = 0 or e1 = 1 the corresponding group is still cyclic. In these cyclic groups we can define
a discrete logarithm modulo their order. To construct our lattice we just need to define the
discrete logarithm of an element in (Z/mZ)∗ as a k-dimensional vector where its coordinates
123
Polynomial time bounded distance decoding
are the discrete logarithms of its image in each cyclic group. Namely, the function log is here
defined as a morphism:
log : (Z/mZ)∗ →
k⊕
i=1
(Z/ϕ(peii )Z).
To put it in a nutshell, our construction works as soon as m is not divisible by 8. This
permits to increase a bit the previous ratio: indeed, for two integers m of the same order of
magnitude, ϕ(m) decreases as m gets more and more smooth.
4.2 Adapting the construction to finite fields
We have described a construction based on the multiplicative group (Z/mZ)×, but the original
construction of Chorr and Rivest was working over the multiplicative group of a finite field
extension F×pd .
The drawback is that while the decoding algorithm remains polynomial time, the explicit
construction of the lattice (computation of discrete logarithm) is not polynomial time any-
more; though it can heuristically be made quasi-polynomial time [2]. This drawback can be
cicumvented by resorting to product of finite fields, as recently done in the cryptosystem of
Li et al. [11].
Nevertheless, asymptotically we were not able to decode better radii with such construc-
tions.
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